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Abstract
Our aim is to model a game for power as a dynamical process, where an excess of power
possessed by a player allows him to gain even more power. Such a positive feedback is
often termed as the Matthew effect. Analytical and numerical methods allow to identify
a set of fixed points of the model dynamics. The positions of the unstable fixed points
give an insight on the basins of attraction of the stable fixed points. The results are
interpreted in terms of modeling of coercive power.
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1. Introduction
In his famous essay [1], Robert Merton has introduced the so-called Matthew effect to
social sciences, when discussing biased distribution of recognition for scientific achieve-
ments. As Merton puts it: ’... the Matthew effect consists in the accruing of greater
increments of recogition (...) to scientists of considerable repute and the withholding
of such recognition from scientists who have not yet made their mark.’ Since then, the
Matthew effect has been the subject of research in education [2], technology [3], economy
[3, 4, 5], statistics [6], and science again [7, 8, 9], to name only a few [3, 10, 11, 12]. The
effect, commonly cited as ’accumulated advantage’ or ’rich gets richer’, can be defined
as a positive feedback between an amount of possessed goods and an ability of acquir-
ing even more goods. Even when the term ’Matthew effect’ is not cited literally, the
phenomenon itself is at the centre of attention of historians, sociologists, economists and
political scientists [13, 14, 15, 16, 17].
Our interest is modeling of dynamics of power, one of central concept in sociology
[18]. We accept the classical definition by Max Weber: power is ’the ability of an in-
dividual or group to achieve their own goals or aims when others are trying to prevent
them’ [19]. More specifically, we imagine a zero-sum game for coercive power, with the
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latter not based on a social structure but rather on individual characteristics of social ac-
tors. In social simulations, the Matthew effect is often called to interpret the assumption
of preferential attachment in growing networks [20, 21]. In this sense ’rich gets richer’
means that a node (actor) of large degree (number of neighbors) has more chances to
get even more neighbors, and therefore her/his position in the network, as measured by
centrality, betweenness etc. [22], gets improved. However, this kind of position is not
equivalent with a player’s individual power, but comes from the structure of the net-
work. In other models which could be used to simulate conflicts [23, 24, 25, 27, 26], it is
only the amount of actors of given orientation what matters for the final outcome of a
model dynamics. Perhaps this limitation is a legacy of statistical physics, where phase
transitions are considered of a system of identical objects. An extensive review of social
simulations inspired by physics can be found in [28].
Despite its obvious validity for conflicts, dynamics of power of individual players has
been ignored in most computational models. As an exception, we note the Bonabeau
model [29] (note however, that the term ”Matthew effect” has not been used there). In
this model, when two players meet they fight; the winner gets more power and the loser
- gets less. These gains and loses are relevant for the outcome of subsequent fights. Main
result of the Bonabeau model is a transition between egalitarian and hierarchical phase
of a model society, identified by means of simulations and mean field modeling [30, 31, 32].
Our aim here is to trace consequences of an individual strategy for the player who se-
lected it. Hence the model dynamics includes individual characteristics of players. Each
player is endowed with the willingness to commit himself to conflicts, which stands for
his strategy, and with an initial value of the power. The former remains constant in
time, while the latter is a subject of model dynamics. Taking into account the principle
’rich gets richer’ we can expect a clear difference between winners and losers. As will be
demonstrated below, the model outcome is that winner takes all. The problem to solve
is, how the distribution of the model parameters allows to appoint the winner. Apart
from the random assignment of the parameters among actors, the model is purely deter-
ministic.
In the next section, the model is explained in details. Further, analytical results
are presented in the form of mathematical theorems and stability analysis of the model
equations. These results are backed with numerical calculations, shown in a separate
section. Last section is devoted to the interpretation and discussion.
2. The model
Let us denote the number of players by m, and the player index by i = 1, 2, ..,m. The
power of i-th player at time t is pti, and it is kept nonnegative. The willingness of i-th
player to commit into conflict is denoted by ci, kept in the range [0, 1]. The equation of
motion is (cf. with [34, 35])
pt+1i =
pti(1− cirti)
zt
, t = 0, 1, 2, .... (1)
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where
rti =
∑
k 6=i p
t
k
m− 1 ≡
1− pti
m− 1 (2)
represents a mean player other than i-th one. The coupling between players is introduced
via the normalization constant 1/zt, which is taken as to assure that
m∑
i=1
pt+1i = 1, (3)
what marks that the total amount of power remains constant. In other words, we have
a zero-sum game.
Note that in general the law of conflict redistribution of power is unknown. Our
rather simple version of conflicting fight presented by (1) expresses the natural primitive
principle: each against all. Due to (3) we find, that
zt = 1− θt, θt :=
m∑
i=1
pticir
t
i . (4)
We will refer on (1) as the formula of conflict interaction.
As we see, pt+1i increases with p
t
i, what activates the Matthew effect. On the other
hand, the whole contribution to pt+1i from the conflict is negative. More precisely, p
t+1
i
grows, for players with cirti < θ
t, and falls, if cirti > θ
t. Our computational problem is
twofold:
- what is the strategy ci which drives a player to success?
- how this strategy depends on the actual distribution of power?
To answer, we need a more deep mathematical analysis.
3. Analytical results
3.1. Short analysis of the conflict formula
At first let us put ci = 1 for all i = 1, ...,m. Then using (2) we can rewrite (1) in
terms of coordinates of vector pt = (pt1, ..., p
t
m) from (m− 1)-dimensional simplex Sm−1+
as follows
pt+1i = p
t
i ·
m− 2 + pti
m− 2 + Lt , (5)
where Lt denotes the square norm of pt, i.e.,
Lt ≡ ‖pt‖2 :=
m∑
k=1
(ptk)
2. (6)
Thus
pt+1i = p
t
i · kti , kti :=
m− 2 + pti
m− 2 + Lt . (7)
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Now we observe that if pti > L
t, then kti > 1 and therefore p
t+1
i increases. p
t+1
i will
decrease, if pti < L
t.
Thus, the value Lt may be considered as a threshold which divides the conflicting
society into three classes of players:
It− := {i : pti < Lt}, It0 := {i : pti = Lt}, It+ := {i : pti > Lt}. (8)
It is easy to check that in general both subsets It− and I
t
+, t ≥ 0 are always non-
empty. In the excluding case, when pt=0i = 1/m, i = 1, ...,m, L
t = 1/m too, and the set
It0 = m for all t ≥ ∞. In all other cases It0 is non-empty only temporarily.
3.2. A single winner is generic
For further manipulations in situation ci = 1 for all i we rewrite (1) in a form
pt+1i = p
t
i
(
1 +
pti − Lt
m− 2 + Lt
)
= (1 + δti) · pti, (9)
where
δti :=
pti − Lt
m− 2 + Lt . (10)
Three next propositions follows directly from (5) – (10).
Let us fix some initial distribution of power between players, i.e., we fix p ≡ pt=0 ∈
Sm−1+ , a stochastic vector from the positive simplex.
Proposition 3.1 If some couple of initial coordinates satisfies pt=0i = p
t=0
k , i 6= k,
then pti = p
t
k for all t = 1, 2, ... Moreover, if p
t=0
i < p
t=0
k , then p
t
i < p
t
k for all t ≥ 1.
Thus,
pti ≤ ptk =⇒ pt+1i ≤ pt+1k , t = 0, 1, ... (11)
It means that the conflict interaction does not change the initial ordering of players
on their power:
0 ≤ pt=0i1 ≤ pt=0i2 ≤ · · · pt=0im ≤ 1 =⇒ 0 ≤ pti1 ≤ pti2 ≤ · · · ptim ≤ 1, t = 1, 2, ... (12)
In fact a sign of the difference pti − Lt in (9) defines whether pti grows or falls on
t+ 1-step.
Proposition 3.2 If pti < L
t, then
pt+1i < p
t
i, (13)
and if pti > L
t, then
pt+1i > p
t
i. (14)
Proposition 3.3 The sequence Lt converges to a bounded limit:
0 < lim
t→∞L
t = b ≤ 1. (15)
Proof. Obviously 0 < Lt ≤ 1, since Lt = ‖pt‖2 and all vectors pt are stochastic. We
have to show that the sequence Lt is monotonically growing,
Lt+1 − Lt > 0, t ≥ 0. (16)
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With this aim we use the decomposition (8). If i′ ∈ It−, then pti′ − Lt < 0, δti′ < 0.
Therefore due to (9) the difference pt+1i′ − pti′ = δti · pti is negative. Denote it by −dti′
with dti′ > 0. In the case i
′′ ∈ It+ the opposite inequality is fulfilled, δti′′ > 0. Then
pt+1i′′ − pti′′ =: dti′′ > 0.
Since both pt and pt+1 are stochastic there exist 0 < s < m such that
0 =
m∑
k=1
pt+1k −
m∑
k=1
ptk =
s∑
i′=1
(ps+1i′ − psi′) +
m−s∑
i′′=1
(ps+1i′′ − psi′′) = −
s∑
i′=1
dti′ +
m−s∑
i′′=1
dti′′ .
By this
m−s∑
i′′=1
dti′′ −
s∑
i′=1
dti′ = 0. (17)
Consider now the difference Lt+1 − Lt ≡ ‖pt+1‖2 − ‖pt‖2. Since pt+1i′ = pti′ − dti′ and
pt+1i′′ = p
t
i′′ + d
t
i′′ , using the inequalities p
t
i′′ > ‖pt‖2 (i′′ ∈ It+) and pti′ < ‖pt‖2 (i′ ∈ It−)
we obtain
‖pt+1‖2 − ‖pt‖2 > 2Lt(
m−s∑
i′′=1
dti′′ −
s∑
i′=1
dti′) +
s∑
i′=1
dti′
2
+
m−s∑
i′′=1
dti′′
2
> 0.
Finally due to (17) we have:
Lt+1 − Lt =
s∑
i′=1
dti′
2
+
m−s∑
i′′=1
dti′′
2
> 0.
Thus (16) is proved. This shows that Lt is a growing bounded sequence. Therefore (15)
is true.
Let us denote
ptmax := max
1≤i≤m
{pti}.
Now we will prove one of the main result of the paper.
Theorem 3.1 Assume for a vector p ≡ pt=0 ∈ Sm−1+ , m > 2 all its coordinates are
non-zero and mutually different,
pi 6= pj , i 6= j. (18)
Then
lim
t→∞ p
t
i = 0, pi 6= pmax. (19)
and
p∞max := lim
t→∞ p
t
max = 1, (20)
Proof. From obvious inequalities
min
k
{ptk} ≤ ‖pt‖2 ≡ Lt ≤ max
k
{ptk} (21)
and Propositions 3.2, 3.3 it follows that the sequence ptmax grows with t→∞. Since it is
bounded, there exists a limit a = limN→∞ ptmax ≤ 1. Due to condition (18) without loss
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of generality we can assert that coordinates of vectors pt are ordered in such a manner
that
0 < pt1 < p
t
2 < · · · < ptm < 1. (22)
This order does not depend from t (see Proposition 3.1). By this the latter coordinate
is maximal for all times ptmax = p
t
m. Thus, the following estimate holds:
0 < a := lim
t→∞ p
t
m = p
∞
m ≤ 1.
Let us prove that a = 1. At first we show that a = b, where b = L∞ := limt→∞ Lt.
Indeed, from existence of the limits for ptm and L
t we have:
a = p∞m = k
∞
m · p∞m =
m− 2 + p∞m
m− 2 + L∞ · p
∞
m =
m− 2 + a
m− 2 + b · p
∞
m . (23)
By this k∞m = 1. It means that a = b. In fact both, a and b are equal to one. This conse-
quence one can draw from analysis of behavior of the lasting coordinate ptm−1. Indeed,
due to (22) and Proposition 3.1, the inequality ptm−1 < p
t
m holds for all t. Therefore the
ratio ptm/p
t
m−1 exceeds one and grows. In particular, p
t
m−1 < a always. It means that
this ratio goes to infinity and therefore lim ptm−1 = 0. If we assume the contrary, then by
(7) we have the equality lim ptm−1 = L
∞ = b = a, that is a contradiction. Similarly one
can assert that all other coordinates converge to zero, lim pti = 0, i 6= m. Thus, a = 1.
The theorem is proved.
The Figure 1 illustrates the above result.
0 50 100 150 200
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
t
p(t
)
Figure 1: The winner is determined by the maximal initial value of social power. m = 10, ci = 1 for all
i = 1, 10. The initial values are : p1 = 0.05, p2 = 0.01, p3 = 0.01, p4 = 0.02, p5 = 0.053, p6 = 0.08, p7 =
0.06, p8 = 0.07, p9 = 0.062, p10 = 0.011. Bold line shows the growth of Lt.
By this theorem if all initial coordinates pt=0i are different, then
|It−| −→ m− 1, |It+| −→ 1, t −→∞,
where |Itsign| denotes a cardinality of a set.
Thus we proved that if the society joints players with nonzero and different values
of power, there exist a single winner which is determined by the maximal initial power.
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In other terms this means that the richest player becomes richer and captures with time
the whole wealth, all other agents do not get anything.
Let P∗ denotes the set of fixed points for the nonlinear map generated by formula (1).
By construction, all limit points in Theorem 3.1 are fixed points, write p∞ = p∗ ∈ P∗1 ,
where index 1 means that p∗ has only one nonzero coordinate equals to 1.
Theorem 3.2 Under condition (18) there exist m fixed points
p∗j = (0, 0, ..., 0, pji, 0, ..., 0), pji = δji, j, i = 1, ...,m, (24)
where δji stands for the Kronecker symbol. All these points are stable.
Proof. We have only to show the stability of the fixed points p∞j = p
∗
j , j = 1, ...,m.
It follows from the fact that any ε-perturbation of the vector p∗j = (0, 0, ..., 0, δji, 0, ..., 0)
preserves for its j-coordinate to have the maximal value. And by Theorem 3.1 the limits
on t for all other coordinates are zero.
Consider the exotic situation when initial vector p ∈ Sm−1+ has 1 < k < m equal
coordinates with the maximal value. Obviously the set of such vectors has zero (m− 1)-
dimensional Lebesgue measure. By slightly modified argumentations as above one can
prove that all non-maximal coordinates pti 6=max converge to zero, as t→∞, and coordi-
nates with maximal value come to 1/k. Thus, the limiting set of fixed points, denote it
by P∗k , contains the family of Cmk vectors {p∗ ≡ p∞} whose k nonzero coordinates are
equal to 1/k.
Theorem 3.3 Every fixed point from family P∗k , 1 < k ≤ m is unstable.
Proof. Obviously, a general ε-perturbation of a vector p∗ ∈ P∗k does not preserve the
condition that k ≥ 2 coordinates are equal and have the maximal value. Therefore by
Theorem 3.1 the limiting vector will not belong to p∗ ∈ P∗k .
3.3. An arbitrary conflict activity
Consider the general situation when 0 ≤ ci ≤ 1 are arbitrary.
In this case the conflict formula (1) after using (2) has a view
pt+1i = p
t
i ·
m− 1− ci(1− pti)
m− 1− Ltc
= pti · kti,c (25)
where
kti,c :=
m− 1− ci(1− pti)
m− 1− Ltc
(26)
and
Ltc :=
m∑
k=1
ckp
t
k(1− ptk). (27)
Obviously now the value 0 ≤ Ltc ≤ 1 has more complex non-linear dependence from pti,
in particular, it changes non-monotonically with time.
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In a slightly other form the conflict formula views as follows:
pt+1i = p
t
i
(
1 +
Ltc − ci(1− pti)
m− 1− Ltc
)
= pti(1 + δ
t
i,c), (28)
where
δti,c :=
Ltc − ci(1− pti)
m− 1− Ltc
. (29)
From (25) and (28) we see that pti increases under the following condition
Ltc > ci(1− pti). (30)
Let
Lti,c :=
∑
k 6=i
ckp
t
k(1− ptk), (31)
then (30) has a form
Lti,c
ci
> (1− pti)2. (32)
Unfortunately, in general, no one of both conditions (30), (32) guarantee the global
increasing for pti, but only the local behavior. Nevertheless, we are able to get some
strategic characteristic of the relative behaviours for players in terms of their ratios
Rtik :=
pti
ptk
, i, k = 1, ...,m.
Since due to (25)
Rt+1ik = R
t
ik ·
m− 1− ci(1− pti)
m− 1− ck(1− ptk)
, (33)
we obtain
Proposition 3.4 The ratio Rtik grows with t→∞, iff
ci(1− pti) < ck(1− ptk). (34)
Theorem 3.4 Assume
ci(1− pti) < Ltc < ck(1− ptk). (35)
hold for a single i = i1 and all k 6= i1. Then
p∞i1 = limt→∞ p
t
i1 = 1, p
∞
k 6=i1 = limt→∞ p
t
k = 0. (36)
All these limit points are stable.
Proof. By the left part of (35), pt+1i1 grows (see (28). Obviously R
t+1
i1k
> 1 since due
to (35), we have
ci1(1− pti1) < ck(1− ptk). (37)
and therefore the inequalities
ci1(1− pt+1i1 ) < ck(1− pt+1k ) (38)
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are also true. They, in general, do not guarantee that pt+1i1 grows quicker than each p
t+1
k .
But thanks to the right part of (35), all pt+1k in fact decrease. Since (35) are fulfilled for
each t we get (36). Clearly, the limit points are fixed.
To prove its stability we will consider without of loss generality the case p∞ ≡ p∗ =
(1, 0, 0, ..., 0) and show this vector attracts all vectors of type p∗,ε = (1−ε1, ε2, ..., εm), ε1 =∑
k 6=1 εk with ε1 small enough. In fact, we have to check the inequality (p
∗,ε
1 )
t=1 > p∗,ε1 =
1− ε1 only for the first coordinate. It is equivalent (see (35)) to
c1(1− p∗,ε1 ) < Lc,ε, Lc,ε =
∑
k
ckεk(1− εk).
In turn, the equivalent inequality has a form c1ε21 <
∑
k 6=1 ckεk(1 − εk), or
∑
k ckε
2
k <∑
k 6=1 ckεk. Clearly, the last inequality is fulfilled for all εk small enough, since the left
side is constituted with square of εk.
Proposition 3.5 Assume ci1 < ck and for some t the inequalities
ci(1− pti) < Ltc < ck(1− ptk), ptk < 1/2 (39)
hold for a single i = i1 and all k 6= i1. Then these inequalities are true for all t+n, n ≥ 1.
Proof. Obviously Rt+1i1k > 1 since due to (39) we have (37) for i = i1 and all k 6= i1
Therefore the inequalities (38) hold too. To show ci1(1− pt+1i1 ) < Lt+1c one can consider
the ratio
Lt+1c
ci1(1− pt+1i1 )
=
ci1p
t+1
i1
(1− pt+1i1 )
ci1(1− pt+1i1 )
+
∑
k 6=i1 ckp
t+1
k (1− pt+1k )
ci1(1− pt+1i1 )
.
Using (38) we find that Lt+1c /ci1(1− pt+1i1 ) >
∑m
i=1 p
t+1
i = 1. Therefore p
t+1
i1
grows. The
proof of validity Lt+1c < ck(1 − pt+1k ) requires more deep observations. At (t + 1)-th
step the value of Ltc changes due to two reasons. At first, it falls since all p
t+1
k falls
due to assumption ptk < 1/2 and by inequalities L
t
c < ck(1 − ptk) (see (28) with i = k).
At second, it grows since ci1(1 − pti1) < Ltc (see also (28) with i = i1). We assert that
inequalities Lt+1c > ck(1 − pt+1k ) could not fulfilled if ci1 < ck for all k 6= i1. The proof
is purely geometrical. To show this fact one need to compare the graphics of functions
ci1p
t
i1
(1−pti1) and ckptk(1−ptk) for k with maximal value of ptk. By induction we continue
our argumentations for any n > 1.
Thus, (36) is also true under conditions of Proposition 3.5 (see Figure 2).
Denote by P∗k,c the set of fixed points for the general case 0 ≤ ci ≤ 1, where 1 ≤ k ≤ m
means a number of nonzero coordinates.
Theorem 3.5 Each fixed point p∗ ∈ P∗k,c, k > 1 is unstable.
Proof Consider any p∗ ∈ P∗k,c, k > 2 and a couple of it nonzero coordinates p∗i1 , p∗i2 .
They have to satisfy the equality
ci1(1− p∗i1) = L∗c = ci2(1− p∗i2).
Assume p∗i1 ≥ p∗i2 and replace p∗i1 on p∗i1,ε = p∗i1 +ε and p∗i2 on p∗i2,ε = p∗i1−ε, ε > 0. Then
we easily check that for any small ε, the above equalities transform into inequalities
ci1(1− p∗i1,ε) < L∗c,ε < Lc < ci2(1− p∗i2,ε).
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Figure 2: The second player becomes winner due to conditions (39) from Proposition 3.5. m = 3, p1 =
0.4065, p2 = 0.2513, p3 = 0.3421, c1 = 0.4588, c2 = 0.41967, c3 = 0.2896
Since now p∗i2,ε < 1/2 due to k > 2, we can use Proposition 3.5. Thus, (p
∗
i1,ε
)t increases
and (p∗i2,ε)
t falls. For the case k = 2 see next subsection.
3.4. Structure of fixed points
For clarity our assertion in more details, first we consider the case m = 2; although
very simple, it provides a good starting point. The set of Eqns (1) reduce to only one
pt+1 =
pt(1− c1 + c1pt)
1− (c1 + c2)pt(1− pt) . (40)
with three fixed points: p∗ = 0, p∗ = 1 and p∗ = c1/(c1+ c2). To state their stability, we
need to compare |∂pt+1/∂pt|, calculated at the fixed point, with one [33]. This expression
is equal to 1− c1 and 1− c2 for p∗ = 0 and p∗ = 1, respectively. Hence, both these fixed
points are stable except the cases ci = 0, where the stability is marginal. At the third
fixed point the derivative is |∂pt+1/∂pt| = (c1+ c2)/(c1+ c2− c1c2) > 1, hence this fixed
point is unstable. This is an illustration of the above-given general theorem, that all
fixed points different than {p∗i } = {0, 0, ..., 0, 1, 0, ..., 0} are unstable.
It is easy to see that the attraction basin for the fixed point p∗ = 1 (p*=0) is interval
(c1/(c1 + c2), 1] ([0, c1/(c1 + c2)). Indeed, since now Lc = (c1 + c2)p(1− p) from (28) it
follows that pt grows to 1 only if c1(1− p) < Lc, i.e., if p > c1/(c1 + c2). Otherwise, i.e.,
if p < c1/(c1 + c2), that is equivalent to c1(1 − p) > Lc, the value pt goes to zero. The
unstable fixed point c1/(c1 + c2) has its basin empty.
One can put the inverse question (some kind of the two players problem). Given
0 < p < 1 and 0 < c2 ≤ 1 what c1 guarantees p∗ = 1? From (28) we find solution
c1 < c2p/(1− p). In particular, if c2 = 1 the first player with any initial p > 0 wins if he
take c1 < p/(1− p).
We note, in the case of three players the similar question (see below) requires essen-
tially more effort.
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For m = 3, the normalization condition reduces the number of equations to two. For
simplicity, let us use variables x, y, 1 − x − y instead of p1, p2, p3, and primes instead of
time index t+ 1; the time index t will be omitted. Then we have
x′ =
x(1− c1 + c1x)
1− c1x(1− x)− c2y(1− y)− c3(x+ y)(1− x− y) (41)
y′ =
y(1− c2 + c2y)
1− c1x(1− x)− c2y(1− y)− c3(x+ y)(1− x− y)
Basically, there are seven fixed points: (x∗, y∗) = i) (1, 0), ii) (0, 1), iii) (0, 0),
iv) (c1/(c1 + c2), c2/(c1 + c2)), v) (c1/(c1 + c3), 0), vii) (0, c2/(c2 + c3), and vii)( c1(c2 + c3)− c2c3
c1c2 + c2c3 + c3c1
,
c2(c3 + c1)− c1c3
c1c2 + c2c3 + c3c1
)
(42)
However, the coordinates of the last fixed point are not necessarily positive. To keep all
coordinates (x∗, y∗, 1− x∗ − y∗) nonnegative, three conditions should be fulfilled:
c1 > c2c3/(c2 + c3)
c2 > c3c1/(c3 + c1) (43)
c3 > c1c2/(c1 + c2)
Now suppose that with the coefficient c3 we are at the limit case, i.e. c3(c1+ c2) = c1c2.
After some simple algebra we get x + y = 1, hence for the seventh fixed point given by
Eq. (42) we get p∗3 = 0. Also, its first coordinate x
∗ = c1/(c1 + c2), what means that
the two fixed points (iv) and (vii) collide. When c3 decreases further, the seventh fixed
point leaves the simplex where {pi > 0}.
As we know from the preceding subsection, the only stable fixed points appear at
the corners of the m-cube, where one player got the whole power (p∗i = 1). We can
check the stability of such fixed points, taking x = 1 as an example. There, the eigenval-
ues of the Jacobian are (1−c3/2, 1−c2/2), what is nicely consistent with the case m = 2.
The question about the attraction basins for stable fixed points is more complex and
here we present only particular numerical results.
Consider the case i), two next cases, ii), iii) are analogical.
Let c1 < c2, c3. If p1 > p2, p3, then, due to (33), the both inequalities c1(1 − p1) <
c2(1 − p2), c3(1 − p3) become with time stricter. This means that p′2, p′3 fall and hence
x∗ = 1. It is only a part of the attractive basin for point x∗ = 1. Conditions p1 = p2 > p3,
p1 = p3 > p2 give, by same argumentation, else two parts. Moreover, for enough small
c1 the attractive basin of x∗ contains points p1, p2, p3 with p1 < p2, p3. It follows from
the fact that if c1 = 0, then x∗ attracts all points with p1 6= 0 since in this case both
ratios Rt1,2, R
t
1,3 grows (see (33). Figure 3 demonstrates above phenomenon for p1 with
minimal value in a general case (m=10).
The fixed points iv), v), vi) are highly unstable. Any small perturbation of points x*,
y* violates the balance c1(1 − x∗)/c2(1 − y∗) = 1 which, due to (33), goes far from 1
with time.
11
0 20 40 60 80
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
t
p(t
)
Figure 3: The player with smallest initial social energy (power) becomes the winner. m = 10, ck =
0, pk = mini{pi}, ci = 1 for all i = 1, 10, i 6= k. The initial values are: p1 = 0.0182, p2 = 0.0364, p3 =
0.1309, p4 = 0.0290, p5 = 0.1164, p6 = 0.1018, p7 = 0.1455, p8 = 0.0873, p9 = 0.16, p10 = 0.1745.
In the general case of unlimited number m of players and ci > 0 ∀i, we have m
’corner’ fixed points and m(m − 1)/2 ’edge’ fixed points where p∗i = 0 for all but two
players. As we have seen for m = 3, more fixed points are possible if the coefficients ci
fulfill appropriate conditions. Accordingly, the maximal number of the fixed points is
m∑
k=1
(
m
k
)
= 2m − 1. (44)
The actual number of fixed points can be less, if some of them fall out of the area where
∀i, pi > 0.
The positions of the unstable fixed points can give hints on the boundaries of the
basins of atraction of the stable fixed points. This advantage is demonstrated numerically
in the next section.
4. Basins of attraction: m = 3 and beyond
In Figs. (4 , 5 , 6), three simplexes are shown for m = 3 and various sets of the co-
efficients ci. In Fig. (4), the coefficients ci are approximately equal: c1 = 0.5, c2 = 0.49,
and c3 = 0.51. The seventh internal unstable fixed point is placed almost in the middle
of the simplex, and the basins of attraction are almost of the same size. In Fig. (5), the
coefficients ci (c1 = 0.24, c2 = 0.4, c3 = 0.6) are set as to assure the internal fixed point
at the same position as the edge fixed point; hence these two fixed points, both unstable,
collide. In Fig. (6), the coefficients ci (c1 = 0.5, c2 = 0.3, c3 = 0.1) are chosen as to
make the seventh fixed point out of the simplex. As we see, the pictures in Figs. (5) and
(6) are qualitatively the same, except the order of the coefficients ci. All the unstable
fixed points are placed at the boundaries between the basins of attraction.
We conjecture that the same rules apply for higher dimensions of the system. Consider
the case of a given m. Having fixed m − 3 coordinates of a fixed point equal zero, we
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Figure 4: For close values of conflict activities, c1 = 0.5, c2 = 0.49, c3 = 0.51, basins of attraction divide
the 2-dimensional simplex into three parts of similar size. The unstable fixed points, marked here by
stars, lie at the boundaries between the basins, marked by continuous black lines. Red trajectories
(color online) tend to (1, 0, 0) (bottom right), blue trajectories tend to (0, 1, 0) (bottom left), and green
trajectories tend to (0, 0, 1) (top).
are left with a three-dimensional system described above in this subsection. The same
rule should apply to any dimensionality m and k. This is a consequence of the model
equations (Eq. 1): each subspace W where pi = 0 for some subset of actors i ∈ W is
invariant, and the mere existence of these actors does not influence the system behavior.
5. Discussion
The structure of the fixed points, described above, allows to summarize the results as
follows. Generic trajectories end up at one of the fixed points where pi = 1 for one player
i, pj = 0 for all other j-s. Which one of such points is selected, depends on the set of the
coefficients ci and on the initial values of pi’s. The latter dependence can be expressed
in the form of basins of attraction of the stable fixed points. As a rule, the unstable fixed
points are placed at the boundaries of the basins, hence they provide valuable informa-
tion on these boundaries. Accordingly, for m = 2 there are three fixed points, two stable
(0,1) and (1,0), and third unstable at the edge between the stable ones. For m = 3 there
are three stable fixed points at the corners of the simplex, and three unstable fixed points
at the edges of the triangle. Out of the coordinates of the latter, one is equal to zero.
It is also possible that there is a seventh fixed point, either within the triangle surface
or at the edge; in the latter case it coincides with one of fixed poins at the edge. This
seventh point is also unstable. For higher m, a classification is possible along the same
rules. For m = 4 there are four stable fixed points (three coordinates of each equal to
zero), and 6 unstable ’edge’ fixed points with two coordinates equal to zero. Four further
’surface’ fixed points can also appear, in the analogy to the case m = 3. Finally, one
13
Figure 5: The fixed point p∗ = (1, 0, 0) (bottom right) which represents the player with the smallest
conflict activity (c1 = 0.24, c2 = 0.4, c3 = 0.6,) has the largest basin of attraction. Here the central
(seventh) fixed point collides with one of the edge fixed points.
unstable fixed point can appear within the volume of the simplex. If the latter happens
to be at the surface, it coincides with the existing one at the same surface. In this way,
the structure of all but the last of the fixed points for m + 1-dimensional simplex can
be reconstructed from the structure for m-dimensional one by adding coordinates equal
zero to the existing fixed points.
There are some interesting analogies of these model results and the social reality.
First is that basically, the winner is this player who engages minimally in the conflict.
The winning strategy is to withdraw from the conflict, what can be carried out by set-
ting ci = 0. If this strategy is accepted by all players, i.e. ci = 0 for each i, there is no
conflict at all, and everybody stays with her/his initial power pi. This is a kind of the
Nash equilibrium [38]; whoever enters into conflict, loses. However, we know that people
enter into conflict for various reasons, which are out of scope of the paradigm of rational
players. Our results indicate that even the most aggressive player (with the largest value
of ci) can win, if his initial power pi is large enough. In this sense, the Matthew effect is
reproduced here.
Summarizing, a model of conflict is proposed and explored, which takes into account
the dependence of strategy on the actual power of a player. The structure of state
space of model variables, controlled by nonlinear difference equations, reveals interesting
phenomena as collisions of unstable fixed points. Further extensions of the model will
include coalitions and state dependent strategies.
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Figure 6: For activity values c1 = 0.5, c2 = 0.3, c3 = 0.1, y = p3 the central (seventh) fixed point is
arranged out of the simplex and the basins of attraction are subjected to a strong deformation.
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